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Abstract
Th is paper examines the social status of amateur athletes in respect of discrimination 
they may encounter in comparison with professional athletes. It also addresses the 
issue of the Italian ‘vincolo sportivo’ and correlative violations of EU law on the free 
movement of workers. Finally, some possible solutions are proposed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
More than twenty years aft er the Bosman case1 employment law and sports still make 
a diffi  cult combination. Th e purpose of this article is to present an ongoing debate 
in Italy regarding the relationship between professional sport, amateur sport and 
employment protection.
* Roberto Carmina, Attorney, Doctoral Candidate at the University of Palermo, Italy.
1 Court of Justice of the European Communities, 15 December 1995, C-415/93, ASBL Union Royale 
Belge des Sociétes de Football Association, Royal Club Liegeois, Unione des Associations Européennes 
de Football UEFA v. Bosman, European Court Reports 1995 I-04921. In connection with this decision 
of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, see, among others, M. Coccia and C. Nizzo, 
‘Il dopo Bosman e il modello sportivo europeo’, Rivista di diritto sportivo 1998, 335; M. Di Filippo, 
‘La libera circolazione dei calciatori professionisti alla luce della sentenza Bosman’, Rivista italiana 
di diritto del lavoro 1996, 232; L. Angelini, ‘La libertà di circolazione dei calciatori professionisti 
dopo la sentenza Bosman e gli eff etti nell’ordinamento italiano’, Lavoro e diritto 1997, 625; S. R. 
Weatherill, ‘Bosman changed everything: the rise of EC Sports Law’, in M. Poiares Maduro and L. 
Azoulai (eds.), Th e past and future of EU Law: the classics of EU law revisited on the 50th anniversary 
of the Rome Treaty, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010, 480; J. Anderson, Modern Sports Law, Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2010, 320; J.M. Fernandez Martin, ‘Free movement of workers and social security, 
re defi ning obstacles to the free movement of workers’, European Law Review, 1996, 513.
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Th e distinction between amateur sport and professional sport, in Italy, is not very 
clear.2 Amateur sport in Italy is not only recreational, it also includes competitive 
sports played at a high level. In theory, in amateur sport, participants do not receive 
remuneration, while in professional sports athletes are paid for their performance.
However, in Italy, many participants in amateur sport are paid, and should thus be 
considered as professionals. Nevertheless, Italian sports federations do not qualify all 
paid sport participants as professionals. Sports federations explicitly defi ne a category 
of professional sport participants, but this category is quite limited and does not 
include all paid performers. All non-professionals are considered to be amateurs.
Th is problem originates from Act No. 91/1981 on professional sport activity. Th is 
Act clarifi es that certain sport can be defi ned as professional as long as it concerns an 
activity which is paid and carried out in a continuous way in the disciplines regulated 
by CONI (Italian Olympic Committee).3 According to this Act, the distinction 
between amateur and professional athletes is a matter of choice of the competent sports 
federations in accordance with the guidelines established by CONI. However, CONI 
has remitted the power to formulate the criteria necessary to determine the nature of 
the sport to the statutory autonomy of sports federations. Th us, the qualifi cation of 
the nature of sport activity depends only on the decision made by sport federations.
When a sports federation does not qualify one sport participant as professional, he 
is automatically regarded as an amateur. Th is has repercussions on the legal status of 
the athletes and the relevant sports organisations. Th is leads to a potential problem of 
discrimination, which can be considered as a problem with diff erent aspects. Firstly, 
there is the issue of distinguishing the professional athletes and non-professional 
athletes as diff erent categories in employment law. As a matter of fact, the lack of 
being qualifi ed as a ‘professional’ athlete leads to the inapplicability of the ‘sport 
employment contract’ regulated by Act No. 91/1981 on professional sporting activity, 
providing for employment and social protection. Second, the question of the extent 
to which these sportsmen enjoy the protection of EU free movement law arises. Th is 
question is relevant in order to determine the scope of protection applicable to them. 
Indeed, in Italy, it is well-known that the Italian ‘vincolo sportivo’, provided under the 
rules of the sports federations, is only applicable to amateur athletes.
2 To investigate the issue of the distinction between amateur and professional sport see, ex multis, 
G. Allegro, ‘Sport dilettantistico e rapporti di lavoro’, in L. Cantamessa, G. M. Riccio and G. 
Sciancalepore (eds.), Lineamenti di diritto sportivo, Milano, Giuff rè, 2008, 171; A. Bellavista, ‘Il lavoro 
sportivo professionistico e l’attività dilettantistica’, Rivista giuridica del lavoro e della previdenza 
sociale, 1997, 521; F. Bianchi D’urso and G. Vidiri, ‘La nuova disciplina del lavoro sportivo’, 
Rivista di diritto sportivo, 1982, 2090; G. Martinelli, ‘Lavoro autonomo e subordinato nell’attività 
dilettantistica’, Rivista di diritto sportivo, 1993, 13; P. Moro, ‘Questioni di diritto sportivo: casi 
controversi nell’attività dei dilettanti’, Pordenone, Euro 92 Editrice, 1999, 5; F. Realmonte, ‘L’atleta 
professionista e l’atleta dilettante’, Rivista di diritto sportivo, 1997, 371; G. Liotta, ‘La gratuità nello 
sport’, in A. Galasso and S. Mazzarese (eds.), Il principio di gratuità, Milano, Giuff rè, 2008, 279; D. 
Zinnari, ‘Atleti dilettanti, sportivi non professionisti?’, GiustiziaSportiva.it, 2007, 23; P. TOSI, ‘Sport 
e diritto del lavoro’, Argomenti di diritto del lavoro, 2006, 721.
3 Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano.
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Th is article addresses these issues in the light of the principles of equality under 
Italian Constitutional law and the EU law on the free movement of workers, in relation 
to the status of amateur athletes.
2. DISCRIMINATORY ASPECTS WHEN IT COMES 
TO THE SOCIAL STATUS OF ATHLETES – 
THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE EMPLOYMENT 
SPORTS CONTRACT AND THE CONSEQUENCES 
ON THE HEALTH CARE PROTECTION
Th e professional Italian sports sector has been governed by Law No. 91/1981.4 Th is 
Act was intended to provide a regulation of the relationship between athletes, clubs 
and federations to which these participants are affi  liated. In other words, this law 
focuses on the employment relationship in the context of the professional sport 
practice. In order to get a better understanding of this issue, a brief explanation 
of this particular Act may be of great importance. Article  1 of Law No. 91/1981 
states that ‘sporting activities shall be freely engaged in, whether individually 
or collectively, as a professional or as an amateur’. Article  2 of Law No. 91/1981 
prescribes that the particular Act is applicable only when it comes to the professional 
sports sector. In fact Article 2 of Law No. 91/1981 states that ‘for the purposes of 
the application of this act, professional sportsmen are athletes, coaches, sports and 
technical directors and trainers, engaged in sports activities continuously and in a 
remunerated way within the disciplines governed by CONI and which derive the 
qualifi cation from national sports federations, according to the rules issued by the 
federations themselves, in compliance with the guidelines established by CONI for 
the distinction between amateur and professional activity’. Law No. 91/1981 also 
clarifi es the extent to which employment law is applicable in the sports sector. In fact, 
for this Act, the remunerated activities of the professional athletes are ordinarily 
subject to a contract of employment. However, there are three exceptions in which 
the contract for freelance work5 shall be utilised. Th is law also states that the 
employment relationship should be created with a written employment contract on 
4 On the topic, see among others, M. Colucci, ‘Sport and contractual stability: the Italian case’, in M. 
Colucci, R. Blanpian and F. Hendrickx (eds.), Contractual stability in football, European Sports Law 
and Policy Bulletin, Bracciano (RM), Sports Law and Policy Centre, 2011, 199; M. De Cristofaro, 
‘Legge 23 marzo 1981, n. 91. Norme in materia di rapporti tra società e sportivi professionisti’, Le 
nuove leggi civili commentate, 1982, 580; F. Bianchi D’urso and G. Vidiri, ‘La nuova disciplina del 
lavoro sportivo’, Rivista di diritto sportivo, 1982, 2090.
5 Ex. Art. 3 of Law No. 91 of 1981 these exceptions are: when activities are carried out in the framework 
of a single sporting event or of several events linked together over a brief period of time; when the 
athlete is not contractually bound to attend preparation or training sessions; when although the 
services subject to the contract are continuous in nature, they are not carried out for a longer period 
than eight hours per week or fi ve days per month or thirty days per year.
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pain of nullity, and has to contain certain clauses.6 Articles 5 and 6 of this particular 
Act deal with expiry term of the employment contract and the reimbursement that 
the sports club receives for training or coaching a young athlete. Articles 7, 8 and 
9 of Law No. 91/1981 concern health care protection and social security rights. Th e 
other provisions of this particular Act relate to the functioning of sports clubs and 
national sports federations, taxation and transitory situations.
Furthermore, the employment status in sport in Italy needs additional clarifi cation. 
In theory, the sporting order can be divided into the professional and amateur sports 
sectors, depending on the decisions of the sports federations. Actually the sports 
federations recognise only few sports as professional.
However, many amateur sportsmen are paid, and should thus be considered 
as professionals. Th e jurisprudence uses a case-by-case approach to recognise an 
employment relationship. In particular, for the applicability of the employment 
contract, the judges take into account the performance of a continued and paid 
sporting practice by the athlete and the course of entrepreneurial activity by the 
relevant club.7
On this line of thought, it is possible to distinguish between three sports 
sectors: the professional sports sector, the professional de facto sports sector and 
the amateur sports sector. Th e provisions of Law No. 91/1981 are applicable to 
the professional athletes (with the correlative specifi c norms on the protection of 
health), the general employment laws are applicable to the professional de facto 
athletes, while the real amateurs do not have an employment relationship and 
commit themselves to a particular sport just for passion and not for monetary gain.8 
In other terms, a professional de facto athlete, although qualifi ed as an amateur, and 
although this should determine the inapplicability of an employment contract, in 
practice, is oft en bound by various legal contracts. For example, ordinary contracts 
of employment, contract for freelance work and atypical contracts that are similar 
to the sports employment contract. In case these contracts are lacking, the national 
courts recognise the employment relationship and the corresponding rights of the 
professional de facto athlete anyway.9 In this sense, the Tribunal of Pescara stated 
6 Art. 4 of Law No. 91 of 1981.
7 Court of Cassation, tax section, 20 February 2013, n. 4152, www.iusexplorer.it; Court of Cassation, 
tax section, 11 December 2012, n. 22578, Giustizia Civile Mass, 2012, 1398; Court of Cassation, tax 
section, 12 May 2010, n. 11456, Giustizia Civile Mass, 2010, 728; Court of Cassation, tax section, 
20 February 2013, n. 4147, www.grandiclienti.ilsole24ore.com.
8 Th e Italian doctrine creates the fi gure of the professional athlete de facto. On the topic, see, ex multis, 
F. Bianchi D’urso and G. Vidiri, ‘La nuova disciplina del lavoro sportivo’, Rivista di diritto sportivo 
1982, 2090; G. Martinelli, ‘Lavoro autonomo e subordinato nell’attività dilettantistica’, Rivista di 
diritto sportivo 1993, 13; L. Musumarra, ‘La qualifi cazione degli sportivi professionisti e dilettanti 
nella giurisprudenza comunitaria’, Rivista di diritto ed economia dello sport 2005, 39; C. Zoli, ‘Sul 
rapporto di lavoro sportivo professionistico’, Giustizia civile, 1985, 2089.
9 See, among others, Tribunal of Monza, 11 June 2001, Giurisprudenza di merito 2002, 10; Tribunal 
of Genova, 7 June 2001, Vita Notarile 2002, 683; Court of Cassation, tax section, 20 February 2013, 
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that the distinction (which is very elusive) between amateur and professional sport 
seems devoid of any validity, since it is not permissible to legitimise discrimination 
between athletes. In addition to this, the private nature of the sports federations 
cannot justify the application of discriminatory principles contrary to the public 
order, and constitute the limit for the conclusion of employment contracts.10 In this 
context, the Tribunal of Trento argued that an employment relationship is present 
in the case of paid sporting activities, even for the disciplines qualifi ed as amateur 
sports, given the primacy of EU law over national law.11 Also, the Court of Justice12 
and a part of the doctrine13 dedicate themselves ‘to pierce[ing] the veil which is 
been wrapped around our eyes’,14 arguing the irrelevance of the qualifi cation of 
a sport (or a sector of it) as amateur, for the application of EU law. In fact, the 
associative relationship of a professional de facto athlete includes the basic features 
of an employment relationship. Th e regulations of a professional de facto sport 
provide a managerial authority over certain amateur sporting organisations, which 
corresponds to the duty of subjection of the athletes. Th is obligation for the athletes 
has a contractual nature15 and disciplinary elements. For example, one can take 
into consideration the duty of a professional de facto soccer player, established by 
Article  92 of the internal organisational regulations of FIGC, to follow the rules 
of the relevant amateur sporting club, under punishment of sanction. Th e rules 
n. 4152, www.iusexplorer.it; Court of Cassation, 11 December 2012, n. 22578, Giustizia Civile Mass, 
2012, 1398; Court of Cassation, 20  February 2013, n. 4147, www.grandiclienti.ilsole24ore.com; 
Court of Cassation, 12 May 2010, n. 11456, Giustizia Civile Mass, 2010, 728.
10 Tribunal of Pescara, 18 October 2001, www.grandiclienti.ilsole24ore.com.
11 Tribunal of Trento, 27 October 2008, www.grandiclienti.ilsole24ore.com.
12 See Court of Justice of the European Communities, 8  July 1998, C-9/98, Ermanno  Agostini, 
Emanuele Agostini v. Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associées ASBL, Ligue belge de judo 
ASBL, European Court Reports 1998 I-04261; Court of Justice of the European Communities, 
11 April 2000, C-51/96 and C-191/97, Christelle Deliege v. Ligue Francophone de Judo et disciplines 
associess ASBL e a, European Court Reports 2000 I-02549. To deepen this last pronunciation, over the 
limits of the above discussion, see: S. Bastianon, ‘Sport e diritto comunitario: la sfi da continua. I casi 
Deliège Lehtonen’, Rivista di diritto sportivo, 1998, 662; G. Adami, ‘Attività sportiva professionistica 
o amatoriale, secondo il diritto comunitario’, Il lavoro nella giurisprudenza 2001, 236.
13 See, ex multis, S. Bastianon, ‘Dal calcio alla pallamano: la giurisprudenza Bosman nella pronuncia 
del giudice nazionale’, Rivista di diritto sportivo, 1997, 864; L. Santoro, ‘L’infl uenza del diritto 
comunitario in materia di distinzione tra lavoro sportivo professionistico e dilettantistico’, in G. 
Liotta and L. Santoro (eds.), Lezioni di diritto sportivo, Milano, Giuff rè, 2013, 122.
14 F. Petrarca, Canzoniere, Milano, Mondadori, 2006, 41.
15 Compare, ex multis, R. Caprioli, L’autonomia normativa delle Federazioni sportive nazionali 
nel diritto privato, Napoli, Jovene, 1997, 111; M.C. Calciano, Diritto dello sport. Il sistema delle 
responsabilità nell’analisi giurisprudenziale, Milano, Giuff rè, 2010, 162; P. Raimondo, Elementi di 
diritto privato sportivo, Bologna, Giraldi Editore, 2013, 65. Contra, those who opt for the public 
nature of the membership, C. Frattarolo, L’ordinamento sportivo nella giurisprudenza, Milano, 
Giuff rè, 1995, 107; L. Cantamessa, Un tema semi-nuovo di diritto sportivo internazionale: la third 
party ownership (TPO), in S. Bastianon (edited by), L’ Europa e lo sport. Profi li giuridici, economici e 
sociali, Torino, Giappichelli, 2014, 123.
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to which, the above mentioned Article refers, are the technical instructions and 
directives, issued in order to achieve competitive purposes, which not concern 
only sporting performance, but also the privacy of the athlete, since he has to be in 
proper physical and mental condition.16 Th e need to respect these rules is natural 
in any team, a team where individual interest should be secondary to the collective 
objective, which is pursued under the direction of a coach and his staff . For the 
athletes, these instructions derive correlative obligations of obedience. In this 
sense, for example, the existence of duties of this kind, for the professional de facto 
athletes, are set out in the collective Agreement from 27  March 2008, concluded 
between the Italian amateur rugby league of excellence and the Association of 
Italian rugby. It provides, in particular, the obligation for the professional de facto 
athletes to observe the duties of loyalty and fair play to the organisation, to provide 
a full cooperation to the managers, coaches, team doctors and teammates, and to 
respect the rules of conduct, dictated by the company, both on and off  the playing 
fi eld.17 Th erefore, the relationship established by the membership of a professional 
de facto club, is characterised by the presence of persons in a leading position, which 
corresponds to the duty of obedience. Consequently, it seems plausible that, in the 
case of an amateur in non-recreational sport, a professional de facto employment 
contract exists (although in practice lacks), which is expressed in an agreement or 
a bond.18
However, as we anticipated, it may be argued that, in practice, professional de 
facto athletes are still subject to somewhat diff erent treatment when compared to 
professional athletes regarding their social status.19 In fact, court judgments only 
demonstrate the applicability of general employment law to amateur athletes, but 
this does not yet imply that a special ‘sport employment contract’ is in place.
16 In this sense, among others, Collective agreement between LIRE – Lega Italiana Rugby Eccellenza 
e AIR – Associazione Italiana Rugbysti of 27 March 2008, art. 7, point 4.
17 Collective agreement between L.I.R.E – Lega Italiana Rugby Eccellenza e A.I.R – Associazione 
Italiana Rugbysti of 27 March 2008, Art. 7, point 3.
18 Also, a part of the national legislation does not seem to give importance to the distinction between 
professional activities and amateur practice. For example, Art. 22, comma 5 bis of Act No. 189/2002 
provides that the requirement for a residence permit for sports work, is to conduct paid sporting 
activity. Further, in this sense, a ruling of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy defi nes a worker 
as the person who, regardless of the type of contract, has a job, with or without a payment, even 
for the only purpose of learning a trade, art or profession, except those which deal with domestic 
service or when the worker is a family member (Ruling of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, 
27 March 2014, n. 8/2014, www.iusexplorer.it, on the compulsory to make the risk document for 
volunteers of amateur sports associations).
19 To deepen the meaning of social status take into consideration F. Hendrickx, ‘Th e social status of the 
artist: a moving picture’, in A. Verbeke, B. Tillemand, E.J.H. Schrage and B. Demarsin (eds.), Art & 
Law, Brugge & Oxford, Die Keure & Hart Publishing, 2008, 102, according to which ‘the concept of 
“social status” would refer to the legal status (…) with regard to labour and employment law as well 




A logic question would be: ‘what are the implications of this diff erent treatment 
(sports employment contract in comparison with an ordinary employment contract) 
between a professional athlete and a professional de facto athlete?’ It appears that the 
answer could be that the professional sports Act, compared to general employment 
law, provides a specifi c and better protection for the athlete. In fact, this particular Act 
contains specifi c norms in order to safeguard the professional liberty of sportspersons. 
In this regard, for example, Article 4 of Law No. 91/1981 prohibits sports clubs from 
including ‘a no competition clause’ in the contract, and also underlines that clauses with 
pejorative terms must be replaced with those of the standard contract. In addition, the 
tax law qualifi es as miscellaneous income the remuneration (also signifi cant) paid to 
the athletes, technicians and similar fi gures in the amateur sports sector, and therefore 
exempts them from social security.20 Also in the professional sports fi eld, Article 8 of 
the particular Act, obliges sports clubs to take out individual insurance policies for 
professional sportsmen against the risk of death and injuries which could compromise the 
continuation of professional sporting activities, and Article 9 of the same law provides a 
pension plan. Th ese provisions are not applicable to the professional de facto sportsmen. 
Th erefore, these diff erences in the treatment seem to involve a discrimination against 
professional de facto athletes, which appears to be unconstitutional, since Article. 38 of 
the Constitution21 provides for the right of workers to have guaranteed, adequate means 
to meet their needs, and necessities in case of old age and involuntary unemployment.22 
In addition, the legal regulation of employment contract does not take into account 
the specifi c needs of the sporting profession. Instead, these needs are fulfi lled by the 
particular Act. As a matter of fact, there are certain provisions of Law No. 91/1981 
that derogate from the legal regime of the employment contract. One could think, for 
example, of the rules that prohibit demotion and the use of audiovisual equipment.
However, we will focus on two important diff erences in the treatment between 
the professional sports sector and professional de facto sports sector, which depends 
on the application of this particular Act. Th e fi rst diff erence in the treatment, which 
we take into account in our next paragraph, depends from the application of the so 
called ‘vincolo sportivo’. Th e second one concerns health care protection. In fact, 
as we anticipated, the sports employment contract is based on Act No. 91/1981 on 
professional sport, which excludes amateur athletes, even if they are employees, 
and therefore, excludes them from the specifi c regulation on health care protection 
provided in the Act. Furthermore, according to Act No. 91/1981, in conjunction with 
the Ministerial Decree of13  March 1995 (as amended), in order to obtain federal 
20 Art. 67(1)(M) of the Income Tax Consolidation Act (Testo Unico delle Imposte sui Redditi).
21 Art. 38 of Costitution provides: ‘every citizen unable to work and without the necessary means of 
subsistence is entitled to welfare support. Workers have the right to be assured adequate means 
for their needs and necessities in the case of accidents, illness, disability, old age and involuntary 
unemployment.’
22 In this regard, see A. De Silvestri, ‘Il lavoro nello sport dilettantistico’, www.giustiziasportiva.it, 
2006, 27.
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authorisation to practice professional sporting activities, sports associations must 
respect specifi c obligations with regard to the protection of the professional athlete, 
such as periodic checks, a medical card and a certifi cate of suitability to take part in 
competitive sport.23 As amateur sports organisations do not have an obligation to 
carry out periodic checks to protect the health of their athletes, protection through 
health checks remains a voluntary option for the sports federations, or for the 
amateur sports club concerned. Also, the internal organisational regulations of FIGC 
(Italian Football Federation)24 stresses that the obligation to guarantee the presence 
of a doctor on the pitch is imposed only on the host association. In fact, it is not a duty 
of the guest organisation to have a doctor on the pitch, but only the right to request 
one.25
A crucial question to be asked is whether a distinction between a professional 
athlete for whom the professional sport act shall apply, and a professional de facto 
athlete for whom general employment law shall be applicable, could be justifi ed. In 
this case, the answer should be rather negative. In fact, the question can be raised as to 
what the diff erence is between a basketball player and a volleyball player participating 
in the equivalent level of sporting competition, except that the fi rst one is qualifi ed 
by the correlative national sport federation as professional, while the second one is 
viewed as an amateur. Such diff erential treatment appears unjustifi able, because of 
the need to consider the facts which should prevail over the formal qualifi cation of 
the Italian sports federations.
Also, the diff erence in the treatment between professional athletes and professional 
de facto sportsmen appears in contrast with the regulations set up by the international 
sports federations. In this regard, reference may be made with the FIFA regulations on 
the status and transfer of players, which underline that: ‘A professional is a player who 
has a written contract with a club and is paid more for his footballing activity than 
the expenses he eff ectively incurs. All other players are considered to be amateurs.’26
A more specifi c question to be asked is whether a professional (also de facto) 
athlete needs special protection of health, in comparison to other workers. It this 
case, the answer should be in the affi  rmative. Th e absence of specifi c rules cannot be 
properly replaced by the application of the ordinary employment contract, because 
23 To investigate the issue of the obligations provided for protection of athletes, wich are imposed on 
professional sport organisations, see, among others, F. Briguglio, ‘La tutela sanitaria delle attività 
sportive’, in C. Bottari (eds.), Attività motorie e attività sportive: problematiche giuridiche, Padova, 
Cedam, 2002, 159; G. Agrifoglio, La responsabilità del medico sportivo, Torino, Giappichelli, 2010, 
74; G. Pacifi co, ‘L’idoneità alla pratica sportiva agonistica e non agonistica: normativa nazionale 
di riferimento’, in C. Bottari, R. Nicolai and G. Pacifi co (eds.), Sport e sanità, Bologna, Bononia 
University Press, 2008, 87.
24 Art. 66(1)(f) of the internal organisational regulations of FIGC (Norme organizzative interne della 
Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio).
25 Art. 66(1)(b) of the internal organisational regulations of FIGC.
26 Art. 2(2) of the regulations on the status and transfer of players of FIFA.
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the athletes need a more stringent form of health care protection. Th is leads to an 
issue of discrimination in health care protection.
In other terms, when it comes to the sport, some behaviors that are prohibited in 
the majority of employment relationships are instead permitted. Th is circumstance 
is justifi ed by the social value of sport. Otherwise, many diff erent sports would be 
forbidden. Th e risks that such activities may carry require a way to ensure the special 
protection of the health of athletes, which best fi ts the needs of the sports sector. 
Nevertheless, leaving the decision regarding the measures to be taken for the health 
protection of sportsmen to the discretion of sports federations does not appear to 
provide appropriate safeguards for the athletes. In fact, it is inadvisable that such 
determinations are adopted by the association of undertakings (sports federation)27 
which are burdened by the health care protection costs. Besides, the protection of 
health is a fundamental right, which requires the participation of the legislator. 
Indeed a potential ‘protection gap’, which may depend on the choices of the sports 
federations, could be based on economic reasons, and shall not be permitted in the 
sports sector.
Along the same line of thought, it may be argued that an issue relating to the 
constitutionality of Article 2, Act No. 91/1981 could be raised under the provisions 
of Articles 328 and 32 of the Italian Constitution.29 It is not justifi able to introduce 
distinctions in identifying the needs relating to health care that are not based on 
the factual reality, but on hypothetical assessments (by the sports federations) on 
the economic and social importance of an activity.30 However, for a long time, a 
27 European Court of First Instance, 26 January 2005, T-193/02, Laurent Piau v. Commission of the 
European Communities, European Court Reports 2005 II-00209, paragraph 4, which states: ‘Th e 
Federation internationale de football (FIFA) constitutes an association of undertakings within the 
meaning of Article 81 EC.’
28 Art. 3 of the Italian Constitution states: ‘All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before 
the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, personal and social 
conditions. It is the duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles of an economic or social nature 
which constrain the freedom and equality of citizens, thereby impeding the full development of the 
human person and the eff ective participation of all workers in the political, economic and social 
organisation of the country.’
29 Art. 32 of the Italian Constitution declares: ‘Th e Republic safeguards health as a fundamental right 
of the individual and as a collective interest, and guarantees free medical care to the indigent. No 
one may be obliged to undergo any health treatment except under the provisions of the law. Th e law 
may not under any circumstances violate the limits imposed by respect for the human person.’
30 To explore the question of the right to health, such as primary and fundamental right, see, among 
others, F. D. Busnelli, ‘Diritto alla salute e tutela risarcitoria’, in F. D. Busnelli and U. Breccia (eds.), 
in Tutela della salute e diritto privato, Milano, Giuff rè, 1978, 534; M. Bessone and E. Roppo, ‘Diritto 
soggettivo alla salute, applicabilità diretta dell’art. 32 della Cost. ed evoluzione della giurisprudenza’, 
Politica del Diritto 1974, 766; C. Bottari, ‘La tutela della salute tra solidarietà e sussidiarietà’, in C. 
Bottari and L. S. Rossi (eds.), Sanità e diritti fondamentali in ambito europeo ed italiano, Rimini, 
Maggioli, 2013, 25; M. Franco, Diritto alla salute e responsabilità civile del datore di lavoro, Milano, 
Franco Angeli, 1995, 133; R. Carmina, “L’obbligo degli enti sportivi dilettantistici di tutelare la 
salute degli sportivi e i correlativi profi li di responsabilità”, Responsabilità Civile e Previdenza, 
2015, 332; L. Mengoni, ‘La tutela giuridica della vita materiale nelle varie età dell’uomo’, Rivista 
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part of the jurisprudence denied the fact that professional de facto athletes could be 
assimilated to professional athletes in terms of health protection. In this sense, the 
Tribunal of Naples stated that, in case an athlete got injured in the course of a game, 
the absence of a doctor does not imply liability on the part of the relevant amateur 
football association. In fact, the amateur football association would not have a duty 
of care (this would only concern the event organiser (sports association hosting the 
event)), and the lack of an employment contract would also make it impossible to 
infer contractual liability.31 Anyway, the courts have changed their orientation 
over time. Th e recent judgment of the Court of Cassation argued that ‘the sporting 
organizations are obliged to protect the health of athletes, also through the prevention 
of detrimental events to their mental and intellectual integrity’. Such liability, for the 
court, derives from Article 2049 of the Italian Civil Code32 and from Article 32 of the 
Italian Constitution. Th is judgement also states that ‘a sport [amateur] tournament 
based on the competition between the participants (…) that involves a greater 
psychophysical eff ort for the purpose of prevalence of one team over another cannot 
(…) be considered as not competitive’.33 Following this line of thought, a focus on 
providing greater athlete protection supports the use of the contractual liability. In 
fact, the Tribunal of Genova recognised the existence of contractual liability on the 
part of the amateur sports organisation in the case in which a black belt holder caused 
injuries to a student, during an exhibition of karate. It was argued that the amateur 
sports association ‘has the duty (…) to protect the physical safety of students and to 
prevent the sports situation which goes beyond the boundaries of the natural risk’.34 
In the light of the above mentioned considerations, it may be argued that the right 
to perform a sporting activity has to be understood as the explication of the right to 
health, which includes among its attributes ongoing medical care for athletes. Another 
reality is that Article 32 of the Constitution is a precept not only addressed to the 
public authorities, but also to the private entities, and confi gures the right to health 
as a fundamental right, qualifi ed as a subjective position inherent to the primary 
values of the person that cannot be compromised in its primary contents, because 
it is a direct refl ection of the right to life.35 In addition, if the lack of adequate legal 
trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile 1982, 1117. Contra P. Pecinovsky, ‘Roken in de gevangenis: 
recht op gezondheid haalt het niet van het privacyrecht’, Nieuw Juridisch Weekblad 2015, 448.
31 Tribunal of Napoli, 29 January 1996, www.grandiclienti.ilsole24ore.com.
32 Art. 2049 of the Italian Civil Code states: ‘masters and employers are liable for the damage caused 
by an unlawful act of their servants and employees in the exercise of the functions to which they are 
assigned.’
33 Court of Cassation, section III, 13 July 2011, n. 15394, www.dirittoegiustizia.it.
34 Tribunal of Genova, 4 May 2000, www.grandiclienti.ilsole24ore.com.
35 Th e importance of full health protection results also from the Th ird Programme for the Union’s 
Action in the Field of Health (2014–2020). In fact the fi rst thematic priorities of it is: ‘promote 
health, prevent diseases and foster supportive environments for healthy lifestyles taking into 
account the “health in all policies” principle’. Regulation (EU) No.  282/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 on the establishment of a Th ird Programme for 
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provisions in professional de facto sport were to be interpreted as a restriction of health 
protection, it should be noted, that these sporting activities, although ideally aimed 
at the individual and collective welfare, are distorted, in the absence of appropriate 
safeguards, and turn into potentially risky practices detrimental to good health. It is 
surely defensible to state that the athlete should not become the victim of a complex 
system of the employment status in sport, in Italy. As the doctrine underlines, sport 
‘is (…) to be seen as a vehicle of personal fulfi lment, physical and social well-being’.36
One can also raise a question of whether a distinction between amateurs as 
employees, and pure amateurs, is correct when it refers to health care protection. It 
appears that, in this case, the answer should be in the affi  rmative, because the more 
competitive the sport,37 the greater the risk to the health of athletes. Economic interests 
are clearly present in competitive sport, which is closely related to victory in sporting 
competitions, which can have an extremely negative eff ect on the health of athletes. In 
this situation, for example, the necessity of an immediate recovery from injury of the 
sportsman, must be considered. Th is does not mean that adequate provisions should 
not be provided for the protection of health of pure amateur athletes.
3. FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS AND THE ITALIAN 
‘VINCOLO SPORTIVO’
Another important diff erence between (real or only qualifi ed as such) amateur 
sportsmen and professional athletes, which depends on the application of Act No. 
91/1981, is the ‘vincolo sportivo’. Th is Italian sporting institution means that when an 
athlete joins a new team, there an obligation to pay certain amount of money to the 
association of origin, even in the case that the contract has expired. Th e decision of 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities in the Bosman case stated that the 
rules of sport could not provide restrictions to the EU law on the free movement of 
workers. In other words, the decision of the European court declared this permanent 
sport contract as illegal, because it limited the freedom of sportsmen to be taken on 
by another company belonging to the same sport.38 Th is judgment has seen partial 
application in Italy, since it was considered applicable to the professional sector. As 
a matter of fact, this sentence was refl ected only in Law No. 91/1981 on professional 
sport activity. In this regard, Article 16 of this particular Act provides ‘the limitations 
the Union’s Action in the Field of Health (2014–2020) and repealing Decision No. 1350/2007/EC, 
Annex I, http://eur-lex.europa.eu.
36 F. Hendrickx, “Doping Th e athlete in an age of presumed innocence: what if the lawyer wins the 
race?”, in B. Raymaekers (ed.), Lectures for the XXIst century 2008–2009, Leuven, Leuven University 
Press, 2008, 185.
37 Also the risk accepted by the athletes varies in relation to the sport that they practice.
38 Court of Justice of the European Communities, 15 December 1995, C-415/93, ASBL Union Royale 
Belge des Sociétes de Football Association, Royal Club Liegeois, Unione des Associations Européennes 
de Football UEFA v. Bosman, European Court Reports 1995 I-04921.
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to the contractual freedom of the professional athlete, identifi ed as “vincolo sportivo” 
in current sports regulations, will be gradually eliminated over 5 years from the date 
on which this law comes into force, in accordance with the procedures and parameters 
established by the national sports federations and approved by CONI, in relation to 
the age of the athlete, and to the duration and fi nancial content of the relationship 
with the club’. Also, Article 5 of Law No. 91/1981 prescribes that the expiry term of 
the employment contract cannot exceed 5 years (if it is not prolonged). In addition, 
the emended Article  6 of the Act states that a reimbursement for the training or 
coaching of a young athlete only has to be paid when the athlete signs his fi rst ever 
professional contract with the sporting club that has provided training. Furthermore, 
this monetary reimbursement must be reinvested for sporting purposes.39 Th us, as 
the doctrine underlines, ‘it has therefore became impossible for (professional) sport 
clubs to indefi nitely and freely dispose of the exclusive rights that belong to the athlete 
himself ’.40
However, the ‘vincolo sportivo’ for the amateur sport (both recreational and non-
recreational) still remains a part of the legal system. In other terms, the ‘vincolo 
sportivo’, which is still in force in the Italian legal system, is a sporting institution that 
operates in the amateur sports sector at the time of enrollment of athlete. It means 
that the club has both the right to use the player for performances, and the power 
to prohibit athletes from to providing their services for the benefi t of other teams. 
Th erefore, the athlete cannot play for another team, without the consent of the club 
of origin, which depends on the payment of a certain amount of money, which is 
arbitrarily established. However, many sports federations have set an age limit (usually 
25 years), over which the athlete automatically becomes free from this constraint. Th is 
limitation must be evaluated positively. Nevertheless, the ‘vincolo sportivo’ concerns 
the years of greatest potential of the athletes’ sporting careers.41
Th is Italian sporting institution might be warranted by the contractual autonomy 
because it depends on the voluntary nature of membership, and the correlative 
voluntary submission to this constraint. Th e principle is safeguarded by Article 2 of 
39 Before the judgment of the European Court of Justice in the Bosman case the article 6 of the Law No 
91 of 1981 prescribes that a sport club when transferring an athlete always had to pay reimbursement 
for the training and technical development of the athlete.
40 T.G. Foppen, “Italian Regulation of Sports and its Law n. 91 of 1981 – A Solution for Sports-Related 
Problems in Th e Netherlands?”, Th e International Sports Law Journal, 2010, 87.
41 As an example of ‘vincolo sportivo’, see the discipline of soccer at the art. 40 of the Regulations 
of the national amateur league that establishes the existence of this sport institution for amateur 
athletes until they become twenty-fi ve years old. In addition, articles 94 ter and 106 of the internal 
organizational regulations of FIGC lay down the possibility of release of young amateurs in specifi c 
cases. To investigate the issue see, ex multis, P. Moro, “Natura e limiti del vincolo sportivo”, Rivista 
di diritto ed economia dello sport, 2002, 69; P. Moro, A. De Silvestri, E. Crocetti Bernardi and P. 
Lombardi, Vincolo sportivo e diritti fondamentali, Pordenone, Euro 92 Editrice, 2002, 1; E. Lubrano, 
“Vincolo sportivo pluriennale: verso una fi ne annunciata?”, GiustiziaSportiva.it, 2005, 40; A. 
Scarcello and A. Tomassi, “Il tramonto del vincolo sportivo. Nota alla decisione del Tribunale di 
Venezia, giudice del lavoro, 13 Agosto 2009”, GiustiziaSportiva.it, 2009, 57.
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the Italian Constitution, underlining that ‘the Republic recognizes and guarantees the 
inviolable rights of the person, both as an individual and in the social groups where 
human personality is expressed’, and by Article 18, which provides that ‘citizens have 
the right to form associations freely and without authorization for those ends that are 
not forbidden by criminal law’. It also could be justifi ed in the context of independence 
of sport. Th is principle is recognised by Act No 280/200342 and by the EU White 
Paper on sport,43 as well as Article 165 TFEU.44 Other reasons which would make 
it permissible are the need to maintain a fi nancial and competitive balance between 
clubs, the necessity to support the search for talented sportsmen and the training of 
young players at European level.
Nevertheless, there are arguments more relevant to this, which suggests its abolition. 
In order to be able to tackle the last two statements, we can refer to the judgment by 
the Court of Justice in the Bosman case, which states: ‘the application of the transfer 
rules is not an adequate means of maintaining fi nancial and competitive balance in 
the world of football. Th ose rules neither preclude the richest clubs from securing the 
services of the best players nor prevent the availability of fi nancial resources from 
being a decisive factor in competitive sport, thus considerably altering the balance 
between clubs.’45 Moreover, ‘those fees are by nature contingent and uncertain and 
are in any event unrelated to the actual cost borne by clubs of training both future 
professional players and those who will never play professionally. Th e prospect of 
receiving such fees cannot, therefore, be either a decisive factor in encouraging 
recruitment and training of young players or an adequate means of fi nancing such 
activities, particularly in the case of smaller clubs.’46 Furthermore, as the Advocate 
General of this case pointed out, the same aims could be achieved at least as effi  ciently 
by other means. In particular, the Advocate General argued: ‘it would be possible to 
determine by a collective wage agreement specifi ed limits for the salaries to be paid 
to the players by the clubs and it would be conceivable to distribute the clubs receipts 
42 Art 1, comma 1, of Act No 280/2003 prescribes the autonomy of the Italian sport order as a branch 
of the international sport order referring the IOC.
43 White Paper on sport, 11 July 2007. On the topic, see, among others, I. Blackshaw, “Th e specifi city 
of sport and the EU White Paper on sport: some comments”, International Sports law Journal, 
2007, 88; J.A.R. Nafziger, “European and North American models of sports organization”, in J.A.R. 
Nafziger and S.F. Ross (eds.), Handbook on International Sports Law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2011, 87.
44 On the thematic, see, among others, B. Garcia and S. Weatherill, “Engaging with the EU in order to 
minimize its impact: sport and the negotiation of the Treaty of Lisbon”, Journal of European Public 
Policy, 2012, 238; G. Pearson, “Sporting Justifi cations under EU Free Movement and Competition 
Law: Th e Case of the Football ‘Transfer System’”, European Law Journal, 2015, 220.
45 Court of Justice of the European Communities, 15 December 1995, C-415/93, ASBL Union Royale 
Belge des Sociétes de Football Association, Royal Club Liegeois, Unione des Associations Européennes 
de Football UEFA v. Bosman, European Court Reports 1995 I-04921, paragraph 107.
46 Court of Justice of the European Communities, 15 December 1995, C-415/93, ASBL Union Royale 
Belge des Sociétes de Football Association, Royal Club Liegeois, Unione des Associations Européennes 
de Football UEFA v. Bosman, European Court Reports 1995 I-04921, paragraph 109.
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among the clubs. Specifi cally, that means that part of the income obtained by a club 
from the sale of tickets for its home matches is distributed to the other clubs. Similarly, 
the income received for awarding the rights to transmit matches on television, for 
instance, could be divided up between all the clubs.’47 Besides, a reasonable question 
is: ‘What alternatives might there be in a system, such as that of a sport, where the 
freedom of choice is not guaranteed?’ Actually, an athlete who wants to practice a sport 
at high level, can join only one sports federation. Th e sports federations and national 
Olympic Committees are the only entities that are able to guarantee real access to 
certain economic activities. As a matter of fact, such a system is based on the principle 
of a single federation for sport. In particular, the option of setting up an amateur 
league, alternative to the offi  cial monopolistic position of the sports federations, does 
not aff ect the substance of the issue. In fact, only the sports federations and the national 
Olympic Committees allow the access to the controlled sports and, along with it, to 
the offi  cial and internationally accepted sport titles that are really appealing because 
they are economically and socially expendable.48 Th e monopolistic structure of sport 
is also refl ected in the rules that prevent athletes from exercising their professions 
freely, by providing disproportionate and unjustifi ed obstacles to companies that want 
to organise alternative sporting events not linked to the sports federations.49
Additionally, it has been argued that the distinction between professional and 
amateur sport in Italy is based on a formal choice of the sports federation, which does 
not take into account the employment relationship between the club and the athlete.50 
Consequently, the ‘vincolo sportivo’ provided in the amateur sporting arena, results 
in a potential violation of EU law on the free movement of workers.51 In fact, as it is 
47 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Lenz, 20 September 1995, C-415/93, ASBL Union Royale Belge 
des Sociétes de Football Association, Royal Club Liegeois, Unione des Associations Européennes 
de Football UEFA v. Bosman, European Court Reports 1995 I-04921. In this sense, for example, 
FIFA pointed to a cap for training compensation, see R. Blanpain, Th e legal status of sportsmen 
and sportswomen under international, European and Belgian national and regional law, Th e Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 2003, 52. Compare also on training compensation R. Parrish, Sports law 
and policy in the European Union, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2003, 148.
48 F. Goisis, La giustizia sportiva tra funzione amministrativa ed arbitrato, Milano, Giuff rè, 2007, 151.
49 See, among others, the European Commission formal proceedings opens in relation to Formula 
One and other international motor racing series, 30 June 1999, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releas, 
commented by S. Weatherill, ‘“Fair Play Please!”: Recent Developments in the Application of EC 
Law to Sport’, Common Market Law Review, 2003, 60 and 61; the European Commission formal 
investigation opens in relation to the International Skating Union’s eligibility rules, 5  October 
2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release. Moreover, there are also some national laws that provide 
better tax treatment for the sports companies that are part of the offi  cial system. See, for example, 
the Italian Law No. 398 of 1991 that gives tax breaks to amateur sports clubs.
50 Of this opinion L. Musumarra, “La qualifi cazione degli sportivi professionisti e dilettanti nella 
giurisprudenza comunitaria”, Rivista di diritto ed economia dello sport 2005, 39.
51 See on the topic, among others, M. Colucci, “Free movement of persons within the European 
Union”, in R. Blanpain, M. Colucci and S. Sica (eds.), Th e European Social Model, Antwerpen – 
Oxford, Intersentia, 2006, 151; R. Blanpain, European Labour Law, Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer 
Law International, 2012, 290; F. Hendrickx and S. Giubboni, “European Union labour law and the 
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well known, Article 45 TFEU foresees that ‘freedom of movement for workers shall 
be secured within the Union. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition 
of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as 
regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment’. 
Th is Article has a horizontal eff ect, meaning that it is applicable not only to public 
authorities, but also to private organisations.52 Further, article 45 TFEU includes two 
principles: the no discrimination argument and the principle of market access. Th e 
no discrimination argument implies that the EU workers may not, in the territory 
of another Member State, be treated diff erently from national workers on grounds of 
nationality. A legal commentator claims that ‘this requirement of equal treatment as 
regards pay and working conditions with the workers in the State of employment was 
not only inspired by concern about the social protection of migrant workers, but also 
by the wish to protect the Member States who might be willing to work for lower social 
conditions.’53 Nevertheless, this is a secondary argument compared to the principle 
of market access, contained in Article 45(1) TFEU.54 In fact, the limitation of market 
access is also prohibited under the aforementioned Article, as the Court of Justice 
states, whereby ‘they still directly aff ect players access to the employment market in 
other Member States, and are thus capable of impeding freedom of movement for 
workers’55 or ‘discourage that player from exercising his right of free movement’.56 
In other words, ‘provisions which, even if they are applicable without distinction, 
preclude or deter a national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin in 
order to exercise his right to freedom of movement therefore constitute an obstacle 
to that freedom’.57 Even if it were considered that the limit of the principle of the free 
movement of workers consists in its application to the labour market, it should be 
acknowledged, in any case, that the EU qualifi cation of workers is not formal, but is 
based on the performance of paid work. As the doctrine declares: ‘the criteria for the 
European Social Model: A critical appraisal”, in M.W. Finkin and G. Mundlak (eds.), Comparative 
Labor Law, Cheltenham – Northampton, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, 379.
52 Y. Hafner, “Th e right of free movement for EU nationals in Switzerland in the domain of amateur 
sport: CEP Cortaillod v Swiss Athletics”, Entertainment and Sports Law Journal, 2010, 5.
53 H. Verschueren, “Th e European internal market and the competition between workers”, European 
labour law journal, 2015, 135.
54 See N. Countouris and S. Engblom, “‘Protection or protectionism?’ A legal deconstruction of the 
emerging false dilemma in european integration”, European labour law journal, 2015, 28, for which 
“market access is not incompatible with the ETP (equal treatment principle), but actually builds on it”.
55 Court of Justice of the European Communities, 15 December 1995, C-415/93, ASBL Union Royale 
Belge des Sociétes de Football Association, Royal Club Liegeois, Unione des Associations Européennes 
de Football UEFA v. Bosman, European Court Reports 1995 I-04921, paragraph 103.
56 Court of Justice of the European Union, 16  March 2010, C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais SASP v 
Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC, European Court Reports 2010 I-02177, paragraph 35.
57 Court of Justice of the European Communities, 27 January 2000, C-190/98, Volker Graf v Filzmoser 
Maschinenbau GmbH, European Court Reports 2000 I-00493, paragraph 23. See also Court of 
Justice of the European Communities, 17 March 2005, C-109/04, Karl Robert Kranemann v Land 
Nordrhein-Westfalen, European Court Reports 2005 I-02421.
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existence of an employment contract are the duty to work; falling under the authority 
of someone and receiving remuneration for the work done’, so ‘an athlete with 
amateur status could well fall under the defi nition of a worker, given that the criteria 
for the existence of an employment contract are applicable to him or her’.58 For the 
Court of Justice ‘it is important to note that the mere fact that a sports association 
or federation unilaterally classifi es its members as amateur athletes does not in itself 
mean that those members do not engage in economic activities within the meaning of 
Article 2 of the Treaty’,59 then, ‘as to the concept of worker, it must be borne in mind 
that (…) it may not be interpreted diff erently according to each national law, but has a 
Community meaning. It must be defi ned in accordance with objective criteria which 
distinguish the employment relationship by reference to the rights and duties of the 
persons concerned. Th e essential feature of an employment relationship is that, for 
a certain period of time, a person performs services for and under the direction of 
another person, in return for which he receives remuneration’.60 Otherwise, it would 
be paradoxical that the application of the EU law depends on formal statements of the 
sports federations, which would thereby become unconditional referees of the free 
movement of workers. Bearing in mind these considerations, the ‘vincolo sportivo’ 
results in a limitation of the principle of free movement of workers, which creates an 
unreasonable balance in the needs of European cohesion.
From the written question of 23  November 2009 stems the issue of legitimacy 
of ‘vincolo sportivo’ provided by the Italian Football Federation, which ties amateur 
footballers to their clubs up until the age of 25. In particular, the written question 
underlines the following: ‘the FIGC – the only federation in the EU to do so – therefore 
continues to make provision for contractual ties for amateur footballers and is one of 
the few to do so for “young league players”: in accordance with such tied contracts, 
the footballers are obliged (with no choice in the matter) to stay with their own teams, 
respectively up to the ages of 25 (amateurs) and 19 (“young league players”). Th is type 
of sports contract thus limits the free movement of the players, which is vital for the 
proper functioning of the internal market, and breaches competition rules given that 
it could potentially distort the market in football players. In the light of the above, 
58 R.B. Martins, “Freedom of Movement in Relation to Sport”, Th e International Sports Law Journal, 
2007, 351–355.Th is author also state that: “in the amateur players example it is clear that the player 
is in fact carrying out the same work under the same conditions as players with an employment 
contract. In practice the rights of these amateurs are not being defended, although the amateurs 
might be considered as workers”.
59 Court of Justice of the European Communities, 11  April 2000, C-51/96 and C-191/97, Christelle 
Deliege v. Ligue Francophone de Judo et disciplines associess ASBL e a, European Court Reports 2000 
I-02549, paragraph 46.
60 Court of Justice of the European Communities, 13 April 2000, C-176/96, Jyri Lehtonen and Castors 
Canada Dry Namur-Braine ASBL v. Fédération royale belge des sociétés de basket-ball ASBL (FRBSB), 
European Court Reports 2000 I-02681, paragraph 45. See also Court of Justice of the European 
Communities, 18 July 2006, C-519/04, Meca Medina, Majcen v. Commissione CE, European Court 
Reports 2004 II-03291; European Court of First Instance, 26 January 2005, T-193/02, Laurent Piau 
v. Commission of the European Communities, European Court Reports 2005 II-00209.
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does the European Commission consider that such tied contracts are necessary to 
ensure that traineeships in the football world are protected? Aft er the 1995 Bosman 
ruling, is it lawful to have rules which, in actual fact, restrict footballers in the exercise 
of some of their fundamental freedoms? Does the European Commission intend to 
check whether the NOIF rules are lawful and, should it be ascertained that they are 
not, to take any measures in the short term?’61 Th e European Commission replied 
that it intends to continue the analysis on the compatibility with EU law of the 
possible barriers that could emerge from the NOIF rules of the FIGC, by preventing 
the free movement of citizens and workers in the EU. Th is EU institution, in the 
aforementioned answer, also refers to the Bernard Case62 and prescribes that it could 
provide useful elements for the continuation of the analysis.63
However, it could be considered that in the Bernard Case the Court of Justice 
excused a measure that was an obstacle to the freedom of movement of workers. In fact, 
the Court declared ‘in view of the considerable social importance of sporting activities 
and in particular football in the European Union, the objective of encouraging 
the recruitment and training of young players must be accepted as legitimate’.64 
Eff ectively, this case law resembles the issue of ‘vincolo sportivo’ if we believe that, 
in both situations, the interest pursued is the development and training of young 
players.65 Anyhow, there is a crucial diff erence between these two cases. As a matter of 
fact, ‘vincolo sportivo’ implies that an indemnity should be paid for each transfer of the 
player, until he reaches a specifi ed age. Instead, in the Bernard case, the player, at the 
end of his training with the club, is obliged to sign his fi rst professional contract with 
that club – if the club requires him to do so. In this way, the club that trains the athlete 
may obtain a remuneration from the player transfer. Th is legal instrument shares some 
similarities with the duty present in the Italian system, to pay reimburse, for training 
or coaching a young athlete, the sports club that has provided the athlete youth 
training, only in the case that the athlete signs his fi rst ever professional contract. In 
61 Written question E-5813/09, 23 November 2009, by Iva Zanicchi (PPE), Roberta Angelilli (PPE), 
Amalia Sartori (PPE), Marco Scurria (PPE), Alfredo Antoniozzi (PPE), Paolo Bartolozzi (PPE), 
Salvatore Iacolino (PPE), Magdi Cristiano Allam (PPE), Licia Ronzulli (PPE), Potito Salatto (PPE), 
Lara Comi (PPE), Aldo Patriciello (PPE), Crescenzio Rivellini (PPE), Tiziano Motti (PPE), Sergio 
Paolo Frances Silvestris (PPE), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Giovanni La Via (PPE), Salvatore Tatarella 
(PPE), Cristiana Muscardini (PPE), Erminia Mazzoni (PPE), Vito Bonsignore (PPE), Gabriele 
Albertini (PPE), Raff aele Baldassarre (PPE), Clemente Mastella (PPE), Giovanni Collino (PPE), 
Elisabetta Gardini (PPE), Antonello Antinoro (PPE), Herbert Dorfmann (PPE), Oreste Rossi (EFD), 
Gianni Pittella (S&D), Patrizia Toia (S&D), Gianluca Susta (S&D) and Rosario Crocetta (S&D) to 
the Commission, www.europarl.europa.eu.
62 Court of Justice of the European Union, 16  March 2010, C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais SASP v 
Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC, European Court Reports 2010 I-02177.
63 Answer given by Mr. Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission, 28 January 2010, www.europarl.europa.eu.
64 Court of Justice of the European Union, 16  March 2010, C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais SASP v 
Olivier Bernard and Newcastle UFC, European Court Reports 2010 I-02177, paragraph 39.
65 M. Colucci, R. Blanpian and F. Hendrickx, Th e Bernard case: Sport and Training Compensation, 
European Sports Law and Policy Bulletin, Bracciano (RM), Sports Law and Policy Centre, 2010, 1.
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both cases, all of this should mean that clubs will have to pay an amount of money at 
the time of the player’s fi rst transfer. In contrast, in the case of ‘vincolo sportivo’, as we 
anticipated, an amount of money is paid also to other clubs, other than the one which 
trained the player. Furthermore, with ‘vincolo sportivo’ the age (usually 25 years) at 
which the player can freely transfer from one club to another, is oft en when more than 
half of his sporting career is over. Consequently, the payment as regards the ‘vincolo 
sportivo’, is not related to the training of the players, but ‘could be considered as a kind 
of non-competition clause between the various sports clubs’.66 As the doctrine states 
‘the transfer system (…) thus prevent clubs from developing their economic activity on 
the downstream markets’ and ‘works to the detriment of (…) players’ since ‘on expiry 
of his contract a club might off er a player poorer conditions because the club has the 
power of refusing consent to a transfer. Th at would particularly aff ect players to whom 
another off ers the possibility of a more favorable contract’.67
In addition, closely analysed, the reasoning of the Court of Justice in the Bernard 
case, that also has value mutatis mutandis for ‘vincolo sportivo’, may be criticised 
because ‘the calculation of the damages should correspond with real and actually 
incurred training costs’68, and should not be determined arbitrarily, as it is the case 
here. Finally, it should be noted that in the answer of the European Commission given 
to the written question on ‘vincolo sportivo’, it is possible to recognise an implicit 
assimilation between professional sport and professional de facto sport. As a matter of 
fact, the Bernard case concerns a professional sports issue. Th e European Commission 
compares it to the ‘vincolo sportivo’, which has relevance especially in the professional 
de facto sports sector. Th us, in this way, the European Commission assimilates them.
Also, although in theory the sports organisation of destination needs to pay the fee 
for the transfer of the player, in practice this responsibility oft en falls on the athlete. In 
this way, the ‘vincolo sportivo’ oft en impedes amateur athletes from changing teams, 
since they are unable to make the payment to the society or association of origin. In 
other words, the fee oft en ends up becoming a burden on the athlete himself, and 
thus creating a modern form of slavery, in which the athlete becomes the servant of 
the sports organisation, and the indemnity becomes a way of freeing himself of such 
subjection.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the ‘vincolo sportivo’ involves a kind of 
constraint of belonging, in addition to a restraint regarding performance, taking into 
consideration that the subject cannot move from one sporting organisation to another 
without the approval of the fi rst. Th is would mean that the athlete loses his subjectivity, 
forfeits the opportunity to express his own desires, and becomes a sort of objective 
component of the sports organization, not dissimilar from any inanimate object.
66 T.G. Foppen, ‘Italian Regulation of Sports and its Law n. 91 of 1981 – A Solution for Sports-Related 
Problems in Th e Netherlands?’, Th e International Sports Law Journal, 2010, 87.
67 R. Blanpain, European Labour Law, Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2012, 329.
68 F. Hendrickx, ‘Th e Bernard-case and training compensation in professional football’, European 
Labour Law Journal, 2010, 397.
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It could be argued that ‘vincolo sportivo’ has the task of ensuring that amateur 
clubs receive the income they should. Notwithstanding, as the Court of Justice has 
argued: ‘it should be pointed out (…) that a measure which constitutes an obstacle to 
freedom of movement for workers could be accepted only if it pursued a legitimate 
aim compatible with the Treaty and were justifi ed by pressing reasons of public 
interest. But even if that were so, application of that measure would still have to be 
such as to ensure achievement of the aim in question and not go beyond what is 
necessary for that purpose. (…) aims of a purely economic nature cannot constitute 
pressing reasons of public interest justifying a restriction of a fundamental freedom 
guaranteed by the Treaty’.69 Th erefore, it could be argued that the ‘vincolo sportivo’ 
is in contrast with the EU rules on the free movement of workers and also results 
in an irrational discrimination between amateur sport participants and professional 
athletes in the application of the EU provisions. So it is not clear how such a historical 
institution, which derived its justifi cation from the rhetoric of free sport, can continue 
to contradict the dogmas on which EU law is based.
Further a question that could be asked, on the topic of legitimacy of ‘vincolo 
sportivo’, is whether the principle of the free movement of workers concerns also 
the real amateur sport participants. It seem that in this case, the answer should be 
in the affi  rmative. In eff ect, Article 45 of TFUE on the free movement of workers 
has expanded to include the principle of European citizenship. Th e Court of Justice 
prescribes that: ‘every person holding the nationality of a Member State is a citizen 
of the Union’70 and ‘the status of citizen of the European Union is destined to be 
the fundamental status of the nationals of the Member States’,71 ‘enabling those 
who fi nd themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law’.72 
In addition, ‘the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States (…) must be interpreted 
as precluding national legislation (…) automatically – whatever the circumstances 
– bars the grant of a benefi t’.73 As the doctrine argues ‘a paradigm-shift  has to be 
69 Court of Justice of the European Communities, 17 March 2005, C-109/04, Karl Robert Kranemann 
v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, European Court Reports 2005 I-02421, paragraphs 33 and 34.
70 Court of Justice of the European Communities, 19 October 2004, C-200/02, Kunqian Catherine Zhu 
and Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, European Court Reports 2004 
I-09925, paragraph 25.
71 Court of Justice of the European Union, 20 May 2010, C-56/09, Emiliano Zanotti v Agenzia delle 
Entrate – Uffi  cio Roma 2, http://eur-lex.europa.eu, paragraph 68.
72 Court of Justice of the European Communities, 20 September 2001, C-184/99, Rudy Grzelczyk v 
Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, European Court Reports 2001 I-06193, 
paragraph 31.
73 Court of Justice of the European Union, 19 September 2013, C-140/12, Pensionsversicherungsanstalt 
v Peter Brey, European Court Reports 2013–00000, paragraph 81. On the topic see also Court of 
Justice of the European Union, 16  July 2015, C-218/14, Kuldip Singh and Others v Minister for 
Justice and Equality, http://eur-lex.europa.eu; Court of Justice of the European Union, 23 February 
2010, C-480/08, Maria Teixeira v London Borough of Lambeth and Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, European Court Reports 2010 I-01107; Court of Justice of the European Union, 
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detected from a selective and category-based model of “market solidarity” to the 
recognition of a “transnational personal status”, which establishes a general claim of 
social integration in the member state of the Union in which the European citizen 
freely decides to move to, not unlike what happens in federal-policies’.74 Th us, it 
appears that ‘vincolo sportivo’ cannot be applied also to the amateur recreational 
sports sector, because it worsens the living conditions of EU citizens in Member 
States, and limits the right to move and reside freely in the Member States. In 
this sense, the online Summaries of EU legislation called the ‘Free movement of 
Sportspeople’ states that ‘the right to free movement is one of the most important 
rights guaranteed by the European Union (EU) to its citizens. Th is right also 
applies to sportspeople, both professional as well as amateur. Consequently, any 
direct discrimination based on nationality or any unnecessary or disproportionate 
indirect discrimination and other obstacles that hinder the right to free movement 
of sportspeople are prohibited by EU law’.75
4. CONCLUSION AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
In the light of the previous considerations, it should be noted that despite the judicial 
investigation into relationships in the sports sector, which aimed to identify indicators 
of an employment relationship and to allow the application of the principles of the 
employment contract, there still remain two obstacles to a practical assimilation 
between professional and professional de facto athletes. On one hand, there is an 
unreasonable distinction made between persons who are in the same position and 
depend on the application of a general employment contract instead of the sports 
employment contract, with, among other things, a correlative limitation to health 
protection. On the other hand, there are the consequences, in terms of violations of 
the EU law on the free movement of workers, resulting from the ‘vincolo sportivo’.
In order to remedy this situation, which is detrimental to the rights of professional 
de facto athletes, some of the legal commentators have argued that the sports 
employment contract should be directly applied to the amateur, non-recreational 
sector,76 while other authors prefer to use an analogical argument.77 However, it 
8 March 2011, C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Offi  ce national de l’emploi (ONEm), European 
Court Reports 2011 I-01177; Court of Justice of the European Union, 2 March 2010, C-135/08, Janko 
Rottman v Freistaat Bayern, European Court Reports 2010 I-01449.
74 F. Hendrickx and S. Giubboni, ‘European Union labour law and the European Social Model: A 
critical appraisal’, in M.W. Finkin and G. Mundlak (eds.), Comparative Labor Law, Cheltenham – 
Northampton, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, 383.
75 Summaries of EU legislation, Free movement of sportspeople, http://eur-lex.europa.eu.
76 Ex multis, F. Realmonte, ‘L’atleta professionista e l’atleta dilettante’, Rivista di diritto sportivo 1997, 
374.
77 Among others, P. Ichino, ‘Il lavoro subordinato: defi nizione e inquadramento, art. 2094–2095’, in 
P. Schlesinger (ed.), Commentario al codice civile, Milano, Giuff rè, 1992, 183; L. Mercuri, ‘Sport 
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may appear somewhat paradoxical that Act No. 91/1981 can be subject to a direct 
or an analogical application, given that this regulation is a piece of exceptional 
legislation (lex specialis). In fact, it derogates from the general principles relating to 
employment, and therefore cannot be subject to the above mentioned applications.78 
In this sense, it should be noted that the sports employment relationship has features 
that are contrary to the general principles applicable to an ordinary employment 
relationship. Consider, for example, the duration of it, the need to carry out continuous 
investigations on the physical condition of the athletes, the particular procedure 
for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions, the inapplicability of the rules which 
prohibit the demotion and the use of audiovisual equipment, and the non-usability 
of the provisions on individual dismissal in contracts of an indefi nite duration. In 
addition, Act No. 91/1981 seems to prohibit the direct or analogical extension of its 
discipline to the amateur sports sector, taking into account its precise titling (rules 
for relationships between the company and professional sportsmen) which expressly 
limit the scope of its provisions to professional athletes. Furthermore, Article 2 of 
Act No. 91/1981 provides that the qualifi cation of a sporting activity as professional 
depends on a choice of the relevant sports federation. In this sense, the Court of 
Cassation has denied, on several occasions, that Act No. 91/1981 can be extended 
directly, or by analogical application, to cases that are not included in its scope, 
given the fact that it is characterised by the presence of signifi cant exceptions to the 
general discipline of employment.79 Consequently, it is surely defensible to state that 
the employment contract cannot be applied to professional de facto sport athletes. 
Furthermore, Article 2 of Act No. 91/1981 was not meant to allow the private sports 
federations to choose between the professional and amateur sports sectors, in the 
absence of a determination of guiding criteria by CONI (the public entity). However, 
this guiding criteria was not adopted because CONI has remitted this power to the 
statutory autonomy of sports federations.80 For this reason, the choice of sports 
federation has an integrative function of the law that was not foreseen  for it. In 
other words, the decision of the sports federations, mentioned in Act No. 91/1981, 
should be a specifi cation of the legislative provisions and of the guidelines of CONI. 
What can also be noted is that, sports federations do not even take into account 
the general principles established by Article 2 of Act No. 91/1981 (continuity and 
professionistico (Rapporto di lavoro e previdenza sociale’)’, Novissimo digesto italiano, Torino, Utet, 
1987, 516; P. Tosi, ‘Sport e diritto del lavoro’, Argomenti di diritto del lavoro 2006, 721.
78 Ex multis, A. De Silvestri, ‘Il lavoro nello sport dilettantistico’, www.giustiziasportiva.it 2006, 12; G. 
Valori, Il diritto nello sport: principi, soggetti, organizzazione, Torino, Giappichelli, 2005, 200; M.T. 
Spadafora, Diritto del lavoro sportivo, Torino, Giappichelli, 2012, 95.
79 Among others, Court of Cassation, section work, 11 April 2008, n. 9551, Foro italiano, 2008, 3641; 
Court of Cassation, work section, 17 May 2009, n. 10867, GiustiziaSportiva.it, 2009, 126.
80 Resolution of the National Council of CONI, 23 March 2004, n. 1256 and Resolution of the National 
Council of CONI, 30  April 2004, n. 1262, regarding the basic principles for the draft ing of the 
statutes of sport associations, sport societies and sport promotion bodies, www.coni.it.
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remuneration of the sporting activity), and thereby, they make choices which are 
manifestly unlawful. In fact, it should be noted that the discretion on the part of the 
sports federations cannot go beyond certain limits or it could potentially infringe 
upon basic human rights, such as health.
In conclusion, it is surely defensible to state that the disapplication of the decisions 
of the sports federations, relating to the nature of sport, seems necessary, taking into 
account consideration of their arbitrary character. Otherwise, it seems plausible that 
Article  2 of Act No. 91/1981 is unconstitutional and contrary to the fundamental 
principles of the European Union, as it allows the sports federations to make a fully 
discretionary choice that may result in diff erential treatment between professional 
and amateur athletes, when they both practice a sport with the same characteristics. 
In addition, it does not appear appropriate to qualify an amateur, non-recreational 
relationship as an employment contract, and it is necessary to resort to legal actions 
and correlative juridical decisions that are made on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, 
it seems sustainable to propose the introduction of a law, a law which provides an 
economic point, beyond which the indemnity paid is not a refund, but a gain that, 
thus, should involve the qualifi cation of the sporting relationship as professional.81 
Finally, it may be argued that the distinction between professional and professional de 
facto sport athletes seems to be a relic of the past that is no longer required in modern 
society. In fact, it confl icts with the principle of equality, restricts the right to health 
and violates the EU law on the free movement of workers.
81 See, for example, Art. 9 of Belgian Act on Professional Athletes, 24 February 1978, which qualifi es 
a professional athlete as ‘someone who takes up the obligation to prepare himself or to participate 
in a sport competition or sport exhibition, under the authority of someone else and remunerated 
with a salary which exceeds a certain amount’. Every year the norm on wage is fi xed by a Royal 
Decree.
